If you are a person who ‘fits’ the above description, you should also be curious as
to whether you might be successful or a failure were you to be processed for such a
security clearance level.  An American research psychologist (who, in the recent past
retired from his Chief Research Psychologist position  in one of his Country's largest
intelligence agencies) has developed a psychometric prediction instrument that very
accurately predicts success/failure for American candidates in the event that they
would be processed for high-level security clearance status that is granted by the
U.S. Government.  In the past, this psychologist (i.e., Dr. LeRoy A. Stone, his Internet
Index/Home page's address is:  http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/home.html)
has  received a number of inquiries, from citizens of countries that make up the North
Atlantic TreatyOrganization, as to whether his psychological prediction instrument might
also be able to accurately predict similar kinds of success/failure but with respect to the
being granted security clearances by any of the NATO countries.  Dr. Stone’s initial
response was that his instrument (i.e., the Personnel Security Standards Psychological
Questionnaire [PSSPQ]) was never actually ‘validated’ in situations such as involving 
NATO country's security clearances. 

     To date (i.e., Fall, 2003), just about all of the inquiries from non-USA citizens regarding
their wanting to 'take' the PSSPQ have come from a subset of NATO countries, namely
from British Commonwealth countries.  These few British Commonwealth country citizens
(i.e., Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom) indicated that they were
familiar with both their home country’s requirements for being granted high-level
security clearance status and that they also had some knowledge that these
requirements rather closely resembled the requirements as set forth by the U.S.
Government.  At first, Dr. Stone declined to administer the PSSPQ to anyone who was
actually interested in his/her chances to be granted a high-level security clearance by
any country other than the USA.  However, a year or so ago, he was persuaded, by
three citizens of two different British Commonwealth countries (i.e., Australia and
England) that they really wanted to ‘take’ the PSSPQ; he relented and administered
the PSSPQ to them and then scored and interpreted its results.  Two of the three
PSSPQ predictions were “right on” (i.e., correct), however he never did learn how the
third one did turn out.

    This just recounted administration of the PSSPQ to British Commonwealth
persons further intrigued Dr. Stone and, as a consequence, he started to study (using the
Internet) the requirements or considerations that are followed by several of the
British Commonwealth countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom) when adjudicating persons for possible high-level security
clearance status.  He was not at all surprised to find that what these four different
countries considered, when evaluating a person for a high-level security status, was
very similar in overlapping with the requirements specified by the USA for the same
purpose.  What is specified in the Director of Central Intelligence Directive 4/6,
regarding the adjudication process that must be followed before a Top Secret -
Special Compartmented Information security clearance can be granted is very close
to those requirements and procedures following by Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the United Kingdom.

    These four named countries and the USA are all very clearly aware that their
security clearance granting requirements are all very similar and, in fact, just about
entirely interchangeable.  As proof of this, government employees who hold TS-SCI
type clearances, are frequently formally assigned to work in one of the other
country’s secure facilities.  Their own country’s clearance are entirely accepted as
being equal to the ‘host’ country’s clearances.  In other words, if on a cooperative
assignment, high-level clearances from one of the five named countries are accepted by the
other four.

     With this understanding, several months ago, Dr. Stone came to a conclusion
that it would seem highly logical to believe that if the PSSPQ provided a valid
prediction regarding the success or failure to obtain a USA granted high-level
security clearance, then it was along quite proper to believe that the PSSPQ could
provide valid predictions regarding success/failure in the same type matter with
security clearance status granted by the four named British Commonwealth
countries.  During these past several months, the PSSPQ has been administered to
six more British Commonwealth countries citizens.  As of 19 September 2003, three
of these more recent PSSPQ administrations have resulted in accurate predictions;
the governmental processing is still apparently going on with the remaining three
and therefore no success/failure final decision has been made by any of the involved
governments. 

     At this point, Dr. Stone is unable to provide a finite numbered validity coefficient
when involved with predictions of success/failure to obtain a high-level security
clearance granted by a British Commonwealth country; however, he feels quite
secure in believing that the ‘true’ validity coefficient is now much different from the
one actually seen when the clearance question is associated with the U.S.
Government.  That actual validity coefficient is 0.79 and this value has been
supported by additional cross-validation research. 

     Employing the very same logic and argument(s) that seem to render the PSSPQ 
instrument being a valid prediction instrument for persons being considered for potential
high-level security clearances (which are approximately equal to the USA's Top Secret -
Special Compartmented Information security clearance level) granted by several of
the more major British Commonwealth countries, this logic and argument(s) can also be
extended to a number of the NATO countries.   Dr. Stone has been able to ascertain 
that many of these particular NATO countries work cooperatively with one another in
matters dealing with military and intelligence gathering/analyses matters.  Such requires
to have governmental personnel of the involved nations to hold high level security
clearances that are regarded as being equal in terms of level, stringency of requirements
for being granted, similarity of evaluation processing as well as adjudication standards.
What is being expressed is common knowledge for anyone who even considers that
NATO countries' personnel must share a good deal of knowledge/information that quite
naturally is highly classified.

     In order for NATO country personnel be allowed access to information that the USA
classifies at the TS-SCI level (or approximate), these personnel must hold equivalent
level clearances that the USA accepts as being the equal of their TS-SCI level.  Therefore
it can be expected that the PSSPQ instrument most likely also provides at least some 
fair accuracy level predictive ability to predict success/failure to be eventually granted,
if they were so processed, for high-level security clearance status.

     In recent weeks, Dr. Stone separately received two requests from two individuals from
two different NATO countries (other than those couple British Commonwealth countries)
to 'take' the PSSPQ and to receive it's predictive information.  This was accomplished and
Dr. Stone was soon informed that the predictions (regarding success/failure) he communicated
to the two individuals (one was from Germany and the other from from Denmark), that each
of the two actually already held high-level security clearance status from their respective
countries and that they were simply 'testing' the predictive power of the PSSPQ.  Incidentally,
both were predicted by the PSSPQ that they would be successful were they to processed
for high-level clearance status.  This of course should not be considered to be a real 
predictive validity test as it was only based upon the empirical results from two individuals.
However, these limited results, especially when coupled with the logic expressed in the
two immediately preceding paragraphs, do strongly suggest some acceptable predictive 
validity status.

    Therefore, it can be expressed, that it would appear to be highly likely that the PSSPQ 
can be considered to possibly represent a valuable prediction instrument that can predict,
for persons who are citizens of some selected NATO countries, whether they would be 
successful or not where they to be processed for high-level security clearances by their
respective countries.  These selected NATO countries are eight in number and are limited
to only those that are shown in the NATO Web Site index/home page to involve military
forces (that apparently are potentially available for NATO project assignment).

    For anyone truly interested in the subject material presented in this Web Page,
the reader is strongly encouraged to also take a look at the additional following Web
Pages, which also describe important aspects and matters associated with use of the
PSSPQ.

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/psspq.html
(This can be considered to be the PSSPQ index/home page)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/psspqfaq.html
(This is the "frequently asked questions" that pertain to the PSSPQ)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/atyourservicepsspq.html
(More valuable information about use of PSSPQ obtained information)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/howtotakepsspq.html
(This one is especially important as it describes, in detail, the procedure one
must go through in order to purchase an administration [i.e., to ‘take’],
obtain results and interpretation of the PSSPQ)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/hrandsecdirectors.html
(Describes how the PSSPQ can be used by directors of offices of
human resources and/or security)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/increasesuccesschances.html
(Describes how a job applicant/candidate can improve his employment
chances with PSSPQ obtained information)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/individualsales.html
(Describes use/value of the PSSPQ for individuals)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/onlyonepsspq.html
(Describes how the PSSPQ is the only such prediction instrument in
existence)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/psspqreliabilityvalidity.html
(Describes the technical psychometric reliability and validity information
regarding the PSSPQ)

http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/securityclearancewaiting.html

     In summary, it can be said that, at the present time, there exists sufficient evidence
that the PSSPQ can prove to be a valuable/useful tool to predict, for citizens of the
British Commonwealth, their chances to be successful (or failure) were they to be
evaluated and processed for their governments' granting of high-level security clearance
status.
 
 

This presentation is a sub-section of Dr. LeRoy A. Stone's Web Site; its address is:
http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/home.html