Home Debate Page Previous Next
| Dialog on
Existence of God - by G.
Brady Lenardos and Agnostic Australian
Round 4 From Agnostic Australian 5/20/05 Hello Brady. Brady
wrote: Concluding, since the way I am using "inability" is
absolute and not contingent, the assertion of argumentum ad ignorantium is
false. Okay.
I misread your statement as meaning that, as yet, you had met only
incompetent atheists ;-) Brady
wrote: http://home.earthlink.net/~gbl111/knowledge.htm Okay. The
argument presented is nothing more than the cosmological argument in drag.
As I said earlier, I do not find the cosmological argument convincing. For
the same reason, I do not find this "epistemic argument"
convincing (nor the "moral argument", nor any other infinite
regress argument). It is not surprising that there are so many of these
infinite regress arguments. Wherever there is progress it may be
considered in reverse as regress and, naïvely, extended indefinitely. One
fallacy in all of these arguments is to speak of an infinite
regress but to take it only one step further. If instead you argued
for an infinite regress of "gods" at least you would be
consistent on that count. The view of Foundationalists and Coherentists is
to deny the necessity of an infinite regress. Rather, Foundationalists
take certain axioms as given to bootstrap their epistemology; Coherentists
maintain a "soup" of hypotheses. Brady
wrote: Yes I do. From an atheist view, there is no answer for the above
reason. From a theist view, there is. Part of the theist cosmology is that
God created a world meant to be known and created creatures meant to know
it. These elements of our cosmology allow us to get to an epistemology
that is coherent and cohesive. Okay.
I take it that you believe either AG or DG because otherwise you could
not, with confidence, make observations corresponding to reality to
support HG, yes? In this case you take as a priori knowledge the
proposition of god (PG = AG | DG). Let us define the proposition of
correspondence (PC) as the belief that it is possible, with confidence, to
make observations corresponding to reality. Your claim is that PG implies
PC and that this gives you CCE with certainty, yes? In which case you are
a Foundationalist. Firstly,
why, then, do you reject the view of other Foundationalists who assert PC
without PG and thereby obtain CCE with certainty? Secondly, even if
pressed for a "cause" of PC, there are many possibilities. Your
claim that "god" explains PC is about as convincing and
meaningful as the claim that "hyper-quantum-synergy" explains
PC. Even if PG implies PC this is no proof that PC implies PG. Further,
your a priori set, namely {PC, PG}, is a superset of a minimal a priori
set that provides CCE, namely {PC}. What advantage is there in taking the
superset when the minimal set provides CCE and when the superset may
produce a contradiction that the minimal set does not. That is, by
choosing the superset, you have, at best, a creation myth that is
consistent with PC; at worst you find yourself trying to explain the
contradictions and errors in your choice of holy books and struggling to
understand why your choice of "god" supposedly once commanded
genocide (1 Samuel 15:3). I
do not find "infinite" regress arguments convincing. Perhaps you
have something else? Kind
regards, Australian Agnostic
From Brady 5/25/05 Greetings AA, AA
wrote concerning Manion’s paper: The
argument presented is nothing more than the cosmological argument in drag.
As I said earlier, I do not find the cosmological argument convincing. For
the same reason, I do not find this "epistemic argument"
convincing (nor the "moral argument", nor any other infinite
regress argument). It is not surprising that there are so many of these
infinite regress arguments. Wherever there is progress it may be
considered in reverse as regress and, naïvely, extended indefinitely. Having
written a version of the cosmological argument myself, I don’t see how
this is a cosmological argument. Most of the cosmological arguments
attempt to show that because the universe exists, a creator is needed.
However, Manion’s argument shows that the atheist position does not have
the needed elements to produce a coherent epistemology. Therefore, if
knowledge exists, the atheist world view is necessarily false. The
only way, I can see, that this would be unconvincing is if one were able
to show the elements in the atheistic cosmology that allowed for a
coherent epistemology. It is only a coherent epistemology that acts as a
defeater to this argument. And since most modern atheistic philosophers
have already thrown in the towel on this, as Manion points out in his
paper, I don’t think his conclusion is in any danger of refutation. Of
course I could be wrong. Perhaps you have the answer? I
don’t understand your reference to Manion’s argument as an infinite
regress argument. He only touches on that topic in passing concerning one
group whose attempts fail. AA wrote: Okay.
I take it that you believe either AG or DG because otherwise you could
not, with confidence, make observations corresponding to reality to
support HG, yes?... I appreciate your effort here, but I think you missed the point Manion was making in his conclusion: If any atheist worldview is true, your comments are meaningless. If atheism is true, trying to communicate with words, sentences and paragraphs is futile. When you try to communicate in this manner, you are already assenting to the necessary truth of the theistic cosmology. Because of this every argument is an argument for the existence of God. This is necessarily so, because the atheist world view does not have the necessary elements to support any sort of epistemology. So, when you argue for a position, you are not doing it from an atheistic position. You see, you are assuming that you (a real self) exist; but, the atheistic cosmology does not have the needed elements that allow you to know that. You assume that you can know the world around you: but, the atheistic cosmology does not have the needed elements that allow you to know that. You assume that inductive and deductive logic are universal and imposes some sort of order on reality and our conclusions about reality; but, the atheistic cosmology does not have the needed elements that allow you to know that. You are assuming that words and sentences have real meaning that can be communicated: but, the atheistic cosmology does not have the needed elements that allow you to know that. As I said before, if atheism is true, we can know nothing. If we indeed do know things, then atheism is necessarily false. If atheism is necessarily false, then not atheism is true. Not atheism is some sort of theism. So, some sort of theism is true, because of the impossibility of the contrary. Since some sort of theism is true, agnosticism concerning the God question is also not tenantable. Regards, Brady
|