Beware of the Dangers and Pitfalls Associated with Being Processed for a High-Level Security Clearance

LeRoy A. Stone, Ph.D., (Forensic Diplomate) ABPP
Harpers Ferry, WV
http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/home.html 

     Would you want to play a game without knowing the rules?  Would you want to start on a long drive to somewhere where you have not been before without having a map or some information regarding distances, expenses, road conditions, etc.?  Would you buy a house without having having seen it, without some knowledge of its condition, its price compared to the prices of other similar houses sold in the same neighborhood, etc.?  In other words, before you start on something new, you believe that some knowledge about the ‘thing’ is important to have.  Sometimes the having of some prior knowledge results in a major change of plans; sometimes knowing the pitfalls and dangers causes one to completely change your mind entirely!  For example, if you suddenly discover that the poker game you are thinking of entering routinely involves single bets of $10,000 or more, are you really ready to enter the game as you were prior to discovering the sizes of the bets that those already playing are seemingly comfortable with?  Many actions and matters are associated with dangers that can best be avoided merely by knowing something hopefully early on, about the dangers. 

     If you are thinking of applying for a federal government job or a job with a governmental contractor firm that requires you to have a specified level security clearance status in order to be offered the job or for continued employment, are you really aware or knowledgeable about the pitfalls, difficulties and dangers involved in the security clearance investigation and adjudication process?   Yes – the becoming the focus of a security clearance investigation has some very real dangers associated with this pursuit.  The major purpose of the educational presentation you are now reading is to hopefully introduce you to some of the dangers involved in being processed for a security clearance.  Also, another equally important purpose is to also inform or introduce the reader to a means for improving one’s knowledge and understanding regarding the security clearance investigation and subsequent adjudication process.

      For example, are you aware of the fact that governmental regulations and guidelines instruct the various government agencies, bureaus, and departments, that investigate individuals for potential security clearance granting, that they must consider 13 general areas or considerations in one’s background?  What are these 13 consideration areas and how does your background, in reality, compare to the typical backgrounds of those who eventually are granted clearances as well as to compare it to the typical backgrounds of those who are denied or are refused clearance status?  In other words, what are the acceptable and unacceptable ‘base rates’ on each of these 13 adjudication-focused or concern areas?  Where can one obtain this kind of ‘base rate’ information?  In reality, it is very difficult to find, especially when it is important to only want correct or valid information.  Incorrect information may not only be useless, such may actually contribute to a security clearance investigation disaster!

     Actually, any such ‘base rate’ information must initially come from the government itself,  Unfortunately, this particular class of information is something that the government really does not want its citizens [especially those who could be candidates for being processed for security clearance status] to learn.  As a result, one almost requires a knowledgeable ‘guide’ in order to gain some exposure to any such a class of valid information.  The writer (i.e., Dr. Stone) of this educational presentation has an experience and professional background that renders him as one who most appropriately can qualify as a guide in this particular subject area.  His curriculum vitae (or CV) can be found at:  http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/resume.html .

     In a rather remote, obscure, and very difficult to find, U.S. Department of Defense publication (which was entitled as “The Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing,” published by the DoD in 1984), a bit of almost impossible to find data was found that sort of describes ‘base rates’ for matters and considerations employed by government adjudicator officials to deny individuals from being granted high-level security clearances.  It so happens that in 1983, the President issued a directive that required Congress to investigate and to hopefully remedy problems then associated with using polygraph examinations with respect to unauthorized disclosures of classified information.  As a result, Congress held a number of different hearings on use of the polygraph in the Department of Defense.  DoD of course did not want to lose its use of the polygraph and the then Under Secretary of Defense appointed a committee composed of the top polygraph ‘experts’ in the DoD to prepare  a learned treatise to show (i.e., to Congress) the value of polygraph use in that large governmental department as well as a review of supportive research pertaining to the polygraph approach itself.  Interestingly enough, this Presidential Directive and subsequent legislation, for more than a year, caused the Federal Government, except for the NSA, to initiate a moratorium on any further polygraph testing. The ‘base rate’ informational data that I am about to present comes from this DoD final report, that had been requested by and was given to the investigating Congressional Committee(s).

     The following is a direct quotation (as found on page 9 of the DOD Report document):

         A detailed analysis was made of the admissions made during the testing 
     of 20,511 applicants for clearance and access at NSA from 1 October 1975 
     through 28 February 1979.  There were 695 persons, 3.4% of the total, who
     admitted to the commission of a felony.  In almost all of these cases the
     perpetrator had gone undetected.  Among the few who had been caught,
     there were six who had been convicted, but who had falsified their forms
     to conceal the arrest, conviction, and time served.  The admissions included
     murder, armed robbery, forcible rape, burglary, arson, embezzlement, hit
     and run driving with personal injury, thefts of expensive items or large
     amounts, smuggling, and wholesale selling of illegal drugs.

          In addition, 2,489 persons (12.1%) admitted to misdemeanors.  These
     admissions included petty theft, simple assault, tax evasion, falsification of 
     travel vouchers, malicious damage, indecent exposure, prostitution, selling
     illegal drugs and controlled substances for profit, deliberately writing bad
     checks, and other forms of fraud.  Some of these cases may have been
     felonies.  When there was doubt, they were statistically classified as 
     misdemeanors.  Not all of the misdemeanor admissions were disqualifying.
     The purchase, use or possession of illegal drugs was not listed in this
     category.

          There were 8,383 (40.1%) who admitted to the use of an illegal drug
      in at least one occasion.  There were 2,228 (10.9%) who admitted using
      amphetamines, barbiturates, hallucinogens, and similar substances.  There
      were 704 (3.4%) who admitted to use of heroin, cocaine, or opium.

          The statistical rates for the admissions of crimes and drugs have changed
      very little since that survey [please note that this report was written in 1984].

    In addition to the above informational data, on  page 16 of the DoD Report, the following additional information was presented:

          Falsification of the Statement of Personal History or personal History 
     Questionnaire is reported only when it is deliberate, and the admission of
     false entry is significant.  Among the 20,511 applicants polygraph examinations
     conducted at NSA from 1 October 1975 to 28 February 1979, there were 1,573
     persons who falsified their security forms.  That was 7.7% of the total number 
     of persons examined.  Omissions included criminal arrests and convictions,
     employment where their work was unsatisfactory or they were terminated,
     less than honorable military service, family, subversive organizations, falsified 
     citizenship, education levels and degrees not attained, foreign travel and
     numerous other matters.  In many cases, but not all, an accurate record would
     have given information that would have been a bar to clearance and access,
     or to employment, or both.

          Mental and nervous disorders were described by 1,306 applicants (6.4%).
     When appropriate, medical releases were obtained for use by those who conduct
     the background investigation.  In addition, 297 (1.5%) admitted they had
     attempted suicide.  Because these applicants were also interviewed at NSA by
     a qualified clinical psychologist, an appropriate evaluation and prognosis was
     possible.

          There were 2,820 persons (13.8%) who disclosed close contact with foreign
     nationals.  Of particular  interest were the 857 persons (4.2%) who admitted
     close contact with Soviet bloc citizens, who identities were not listed on the 
     security forms.  Many of these were contacts began with foreign language
     training but developed into friendships, with contacts continuing  through
     personal meetings and correspondence.

          The examinations includes questions about unauthorized divulgence.  There
     were 2,153 persons in the 1974-1979 study who had prior access to SCI level
     material.  Of those, 126 (5.9% divulged classified information to members of
     their family and 129 (6.0%) disclosed classified information to others.  The
     admissions, always checked by a classification authority, ranged from a one-
     time disclosure of confidential information to a member of the family to very
     serious compromises of extremely sensitive operations to outsiders, including
     foreign nations.   … . . . . . 

     This just-presented above informational data, it should be remembered, was obtained from applicants for employment with one of the USA’s largest and most sensitive (i.e., most important!) intelligence agencies.   As such, such a potential employer should be expected to generally attract the cream of the crop, so to speak, of those who are found making application for employment with the Federal Government.  Even with this very select group, a great amount of past misbehavior (much of it extremely serious) and unfortunate personal history was observed.  Although, the quoted information, from DoD Report, does not specify what percentages of he 20,511 applicant group were eventually granted or denied the involved high-level security clearances, one most logically could expect that many of the total never were granted their hoped for clearance [and employment] status.

     When reviewing the just-provided quotations from the DoD Report, it is especially interesting to note what misbehaviors were not mentioned or described.  One very important consideration, in adjudications regarding security clearance granting/denial decisions is the matter of alcohol abuse.  The fact that this class of misbehavior was not even mentioned suggests that what the Report was describing could actually be considered as a conservative perspective.  Another 'missing' suitability matter, that normally is also considered as extremely important when considering the issuance of security clearances, is that of financial irresponsibility.  No mention was seemingly made of whether studied persons had any histories of bankruptcies, credit denials, patterns of unpaid bills, and the like.

     In addition to being denied their hoped for security clearance status, many of the involved persons, especially those who admitted having committed or were otherwise involved in very serious crimes and misbehaviors, as well as having experience serious misfortune, it logically follows that some rather negative consequences took place, other than they being simply denied a granting of security clearances.

    As indicated in the title of this current presentation, when one agrees to be investigated, studied, processed and adjudicated regarding the possibility of being granted a security clearance, then one has accepted being exposed to some very real potential danger to one’s present status.  A person with an absolutely clean personal or background history can be realistically regarded as being a rather rare individual.  As revealed in the ‘base rate’ processing data, it would appear that the majority of persons who wanted to be processed for employment and be subsequently granted the required security clearance status, in the quite large studied sample (i.e., 20K+), had what politely could be called – feet of clay.  Are you sure that you are any better!!!!!

     Specifically, what are the dangers and pitfalls associated with being refused a security clearance?  The answer to such a question involves at three general areas of consideration:  legal, personal, and career.  The legal consideration is most easy to imagine and comprehend.  Remember all the felonies and misdemeanors admitted to by about 15.5% of the 20,511 studied; what do you believe the government officials, to whom these admissions were made, did with this information?  By federal law, such admissions information must be turned over to appropriate law enforcement officials.  So, instead of getting a government job, accompanied by a high-level security clearance, almost 3200 of them were likely to have been reported to police or law enforcement officials.  I will bet that these 3200 employment applicants wished that they had never applied for a job with the involved government agency which then automatically caused them to be focused-upon subjects of security clearance investigations.

     Personal dangers associated with being refused a security clearance can be multiple and quite varied in kind.  The psychological harm to one’s self-esteem, for some, can be devastating.  For a few individuals who face no lesser threats, suicide seems to be an appropriate action.  For others, going the route of increased alcohol/drug intake is seen.  For those who do not respond in these severe kinds of actions, being turned down for a security clearance still must be viewed as a major ‘personal kind of failure.’  Avoidance of such a personal stressor is seemingly universally wanted by all.  No one wants to feel bad, especially about one’s self. 

     In addition to this, for many, some very real personal damage can be associated with one’s significant others.  When one is turned down for a security clearance, it is highly likely that one’s spouse (or equivalent) and family will be very interested in learning about the reasons for such a governmental decision and action.  Many engage in actions, or have them in their past histories, which they do not wish their spouses/families be aware of.  In this vein, being refused a security clearance can many times, with our families, simply open up a can of worms.  You can almost count on the fact that members of your family, will be looking for explanations in the event you were to be denied the your expected security clearance status, and hence your expected  employment possibilities

     Career type dangers, associated with having been refused a security clearance, can be very easily understood and should be greatly feared. 
What are the consequences of being denied security clearance status upon one’s future employment career?  It means that the government job that one was hoping for is now closed and unavailable.  It means that the government contractor job, that one is temporarily filling, most likely will also be terminated.  From this time on, when one is filling out a job application or the like, one can expect to be asked as to whether one has ever been job-terminated or sometimes even asked as to one’s prior security clearance obtaining history.  This is even true for employment situations that do not require security clearance; for example if one is making application for employment as a police officer, in the military, or if one applies for being bonded in banking, insurance, or in other positions of trust employment type situations.

     All in all, one can expect, if one is officially turned down for being granted a security clearance, that this fact alone can be expected to negatively impact upon one’s future life, especially in the employment sector.  One would be very wise to never apply for employment which requires one to be granted a high-level security clearance unless he/she were reasonably certain that the governmental final adjudication decision will be that the needed clearance status would be granted.
 
 

     Happily there is a solution and that solution is a psychometric device (i.e., a psychological test) that was purposely developed to provide information to persons who are wondering whether they might or could be eventually successful, were they to be processed for high-level security clearance status.  This ‘test’ is the Personnel Security Standards Psychological Questionnaire (PSSPQ).  It was developed, based upon a great deal of research on hundreds of actual candidates being processed for possible granting of high-level security clearances.  Its developer (i.e., Dr. LeRoy A. Stone) recently retired after spending almost 25 years in federal employment.  His last 10 years of employment were as the Chief Research Psychologist in the USA’s largest intelligence agency; his first 14 years were as the Chief of that Agency's Branch that conducted the psychological examinations that were required of every applicant for employment.  In addition to conducting many of the examinations himself, he was required to review and to approve/disapprove all of the many tens of thousands of psychological examinations conducted by the several other governmental and contracted psychologists.

     The PSSPQ seldom takes about 10 minutes to be administered, it is scored and interpreted only by Dr. Stone.  Its prediction accuracy, regarding whether an individual will or will not be successful in eventually being granted a hoped for security clearance, has been found to be better than about 95%.  The PSSPQ is the only such prediction arrangement available – no competitor technique has ever been developed.  Information regarding the PSSPQ can be found at:  http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/psspq.html .  Contained in these particular PSSPQ web pages, are a number of links to other web pages that describe, in detail, many different aspects regarding and pertaining to the PSSPQ.  For example, highly specific and easy-to-follow  instructions for making arrangements for ‘taking’ or being administered the PSSPQ can be found at:  http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/howtotakepsspq.html .

     Therefore, in the event that you are applying or thinking about applying for employment that requires you to be processed for a possible high-level security clearance, and if you are not absolutely certain that you will be successful in being granted the needed clearance, then you would be very wise to explore possible assistance to your dilemma by ‘taking’ the PSSPQ and then using its resultant personal information.

      Increasing numbers of those who ae contemplating applying for employment situations, in which they must be processed for high-level security clearance status, have been utilizing information coming from a taking of the PSSPQ to finalize their decisions as to whether is would be wise or not to initiate the employment application.  If in doubt, 'take' the PSSPQ, you will not be sorry!
 

     In the event that you have already been processed for a needed security clearance and the governmental decision was to deny granting it to you, then it also may be to your advantage to be administered the PSSPQ if you are considering filing an appeal.  If you have been denied a security clearance, you are strongly suggested to take a look at:  http://www.home.earthlink.net/~lastone2/clearanceappeal.html.