[Protag’s Spirit]:  This venerable Socrates, because a mere child has been frightened out of his wits when he was questioned as to whether the same person wouldn’t be able to recognize the same matter that he remembers – and out of fright he denies this because he’s not even able to see what’s in front of him – and so he’s made a mockery out of a man of my standing due to this speech.  But the truth of the matter, you overly bold Socrates, correlates thus.  If with your questions you are investigating into something that pertains to me, and he who is questioned should answer you just as I would have answered you and then he is led into a contradiction and is, thus, shown to be in error – well then, indeed, I too am brought into a contradictory error, but if he answers you with something other than what I would have said, then this occurs just to him, he who answered you, and to him alone.  Hence, in that I merely start off with what lies close-by:         [Theaetetus 166b]

Do you believe that anyone shall admit this, that the memory of something that has happened to someone subsists in one’s memory just like the occurrence of the event itself, despite that the event is no longer occurring?  Not by a long shot!  Or, that someone shall have any misgivings in admitting that it is possible both to know and not to know the same matter?  Or if, indeed, he should be wary of making such an assertion, that he shall ever admit that what has transitioned out of some condition is yet the same as it was before it transitioned?  Or, moreover, that – utterly – there would even be a  “this” and not, much rather, “these,” and indeed, countless multitudes of becomings so long as there yet exist transitioning states – if then, one should indeed pay heed and be on guard that someone is not just making hunt upon the words of the other.  Much more, you simpletons:  go yet more courageously forward upon the tracks of what I’m actually asserting, if, then, you are able to, and prove me wrong in this, that not each one of us has his own unique perceptions that come to be for each of us; or if this, then, would indeed be so, that nonetheless that what appears to each shall not become for him alone – or if you should say “be,” then be alone for him to whom it appears.  But if you go on about pigs and monkeys, so then, not only do you yourselves act like swine, rather also you convince others who pay heed to what you say that they also might comport themselves in such a manner against my writings and in this you’re handling matters in an ugly fashion.  For indeed, I do assert that perceptions correlate even so as I have written about them:  that, namely, each one of us is the measure of what is and what is not, but that, nonetheless, the one of us is infinitely better at this than the other – and, indeed, even because for the one of us things appear and are so, for another, though, otherwise.  And I’m very far from asserting that there isn’t wisdom or that wise men wouldn’t exist; rather, it’s even these whom I call wise, namely those who are able to effect a transformation so that for those to whom malignancy and evil is and appears, that this be transformed into good, that the good be and that it appears.  But now, don’t just grasp again at the mere words of my speech, rather first take up in the following more clearly what I’m meaning.  Namely, you only need to recollect the example that was spoken of previously, that for him who is ill the wine that he relishes is and appears as bitter, but for him who is healthy it is and appears as the opposite to this.  Now, one shouldn’t make the case that either of them is wiser than the other and this isn’t even possible;  [167a]  and, then too, one isn’t allowed to complain as if the one who is ill would be lacking understanding because his notion of the wine is such and that the healthy man is wise because his notion would be something other – but, all the same, it is good and one has to effect a transformation upon the former because this other constitution is the better one.  And, even thus, this is how matters also relate as regards instruction, that one effects a transformation from a given constitution to some other one.  Now, physicians bring about their transformations by the aid of medicinal compounds, but sophists through their speeches.  And never is it so that anyone brings another who has false notions to having notions that are true.  For then, it is neither possible to have any notions of that which is not [non-being], nor utterly of anything other than what each and every one of us generates, and this is always true.  Rather, it is only so that for him whose soul capabilities are in a worse constitution – and, thus, his manner of having notions relate in a manner that corresponds to this – one is able to effect a change for the better so that his perceptions and notions become different from what they were; and it is this which a few people due to their being misinformed call truth, but I only call some notions as being better than others, truer, on the contrary, I don’t call anything at all.  And amongst the wise, my dear Socrates, I have no intentions of including frogs or tadpoles, rather in relation to the bodies of animals I’m of the understanding that physicians would qualify; and in connection to plants, agronomists.  For I believe that these may bring about the effect of transforming plants that, perhaps, are ailing and have bad perceptions, to the state of being healthy, that they have a better constitution, one that is healthier and truer – just as wise and good speakers likewise make it so that states which appear as being corrupt might be transformed into being and appearing righteous.  For what appears to any state as beauteous and just, that also is so for as long as it is clarified as being thus; but those having wisdom make matters so that instead of the previous corruption now only wholesome salvation is and appears.  And just this is the manner of the sophist who understands to educate all of those who allow themselves to be given such instruction and, indeed, these sophists are wise and do well deserve that they [167d] receive every monetary remuneration and the greatest amount of tuition from those who receive such instruction.  And thus, both matters are valid – that a few of us are wiser than others and, still, that nobody has any notions that are false; and you too, whether you prefer this as desirable or not, you’ll have to let this please you, that you too are a measure.  For it is just by this that my teaching retains its stature – and, now, you may make whatever objections against this speech, just as you please – if, then, you have anything new that you’d like to bring up against it so that you oppose this speech with one of your own; or you might prefer to challenge it by asking questions,  this too is fine by me.  For that also is not a matter from which a man of understanding needs to have any fear, rather that in all ways men are ready and able to rally to the attack.  Only do observe this one thing:  don’t be deceptive with your questions.  This would display, indeed, the greatest deficiency of reason if one were to say that he is most preoccupied with investigating into virtue, and yet he proves himself as being nothing other than deceitful in his line of questioning.  And deceit in this matter would be if someone doesn’t wholly separate both of these, the one from the other – for then, it’s one thing if someone only desires to argue and would compose all of his speeches accordingly, but it’s something else again if he really wants to investigate into these matters – and in the latter case, indeed, he still may not ever let up from his jesting and that he allows his subtle cleverness to soar two levels above the grasp of his interlocutor but, all the same, he’s quite serious when the proper investigation is broached and he places his interlocutor in the right and proper stance and only displays those errors to him by which he has misled himself, or be it due to the errors of his former companions, those [168a] with whom he used to congregate.  If you make your case in this wise, o Socrates, then those who thus converse with you shall place the fault of their confusion and their lack of certainty squarely upon their own shoulders and not accuse you – and they shall follow after you and love you, hating themselves and fleeing from their former selves into philosophy so that they might become different and no longer remain the same old people that they used to be.  But insofar as you, like most of the others, do the contrary to this, so too you shall experience the opposite result and those who congregate about you, instead of becoming philosophers, shall be made into archenemies of this matter as they grow older.  But if you will follow my lead, so then, you shall not become an adversary nor seek out occasions to argue, that rather calmly and with an even keel and a steady heart you will give yourself over to the real investigations into just how it is that we mean this when we assert that everything is in flux and that the notions that each and every one of us has, so too is it for him, the individual just as well as the state.  And starting out from here you then follow through as to whether knowledge and perception are one and the same or whether they would be different; but not as you did earlier on, simply and rather nakedly from out of the common [c] use of words and what they indicate, that with which the people traipse about, and just as it comes to them – and thereby they set themselves up for multifarious states of confusion, each one with the other.                                                                [Exit spirit.]

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